The main ontological thesis of the German philosopher Markus Gabriel could be summed up in the phrase: “the Whole does not exist, but everything exists.” If we replace “the Whole” with a more familiar word (“the world”), the first part of the thesis amounts to the striking claim that “the world does not exist”—a phrase […]
We saw in our past entry how the moral philosophy theory known as longtermism is rooted in the historical trend towards ‘the expansion of the circle of empathy’, in order to include all future human beings (or ‘persons’, we might say, including non-human, or post-human persons), and also commented on some flaws of the theory […]
One of the most popular versions today of the idea that there can be moral progress—in the sense that our values and moral standards can keep improving—is the claim, much in vogue now, that such progress takes the form of what’s often called the expansion of the circle of empathy. The idea is that, in […]
I finished my last entry expressing my perplexity by the ‘solution’ mathematicians offered six decades ago to the problem of the continuum : Cohen’s theorem according to which both the assumption that there is some set (say, C) larger than the set of natural numbers but smaller than the set of real numbers, and the […]
Infinity has always been one of the most fascinating and perplexing concepts in mathematics. For ancient Greek mathematicians, it was (in a similar way to the notion of zero) something like a non-concept, i.e., something that one was not allowed to think, and only might express and use by means of circumloquia at the best […]
I shall end this series on the problem of verisimilitude by sketching the main methodological norms that can be derived from our favorite definition of “empirical truthlikeness” –remember: the verisimilitude of a hypothesis H on the light of the empirical data E, or Vs(H,E ), would be equivalent to p(H,E)/p(HvE). Remember as well that by […]
In the previous entry I introduced my definition of a concept of empirical verisimilitude of a proposition H given the evidence E (or how close to the truth H seems under the light of data E), Vs(H,E) , as the combination of the similarity or coherence between H and E, and that between E and […]
For the problem of scientific realism, the most consequential implication of the ‘ugly duckling theorem’ we met in our last entry was that judgments of similarity seem to be not reducible to any kind of algorithmic definition that might tell in an objective way how much ‘similar’ is one thing to another, for these judgments […]
As we saw in my last entry, Karl Popper suggested around 1960 a way of formalising the idea that science can proceed towards the (full) truth through a series of theories or hypotheses all of which are literally false. Basically, his proposal was to define the relation of ‘theory A being at least as close […]
Probably, the most common assumption about scientific knowledge amongst the general public, and certainly amongst a substantial percentage of the philosophers of science, is that science attempts to find out the truth about the world (just like many other institutions or professions, like the courts, the police or whoever that needs to look for information […]