Author Archives: Jesús Zamora Bonilla

<span property="name">Jesús Zamora Bonilla</span>
Jesús Zamora holds PhDs in Philosophy (1993) and Economics (2001). Professor of Philosophy of Science and Director of the master's program on Science Communication and Journalism at UNED. Prolific author.

As we saw in the previous entry of this series, skepticism had a relatively minor role during the development of medieval philosophy, with the main exception of the interesting possibility of interpreting the Pseudo-Dionysius as a skeptic about our […]

Perhaps you ignore that the most influential philosopher of the early Middle Ages did not really exist. This Zenoan paradox is explained by the fact that the writings of this philosopher were falsely attributed to a different, and much more […]

We ended the first article of this series introducing the man who very likely is the first skeptic philosopher properly speaking, Gorgias of Leontini, and who, as we saw, is said to have claimed, 1) that the being is […]

We, philosophers, tend to be more skeptical than the average person (though, if you know a little bit of the theories of some philosophers, I would understand that you take my claim with a grain of skepticism). In this series […]

As we saw in the previous entry of this series, philosophers of mind usually distinguish between what (after David Chalmers) they called the ‘easy’ and the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness. The ‘easy’ problem refers to how to explain the functioning […]

One of the most strongly debated philosophical problems is that of the nature of consciousness. This is no surprise, since it is probably the most difficult question, at least apparently, for naturalistic or materialistic views of the world. After […]

In my past entry I described the tribe of the ‘Halflings’ as those authors who try to find a middle road between the ‘Platonist’ that identify beauty as one essential goal of scientific research (even conflating it, in […]

One traditional question in the philosophy of science, or perhaps it would be better to say in the philosophical views about science, is the role that aesthetic judgments and emotions play in the evaluation of theories, models, hypotheses, or […]


One last aspect in which Dembski’s use of the ideas of information and probability are confusing is the fact that it seems to ignore what is an inescapable consequence of a theory (T) being an explanation of […]


After having shown the ways in which Richard Dembski’s ‘explanatory filter’ (EF) in support of the ‘intelligent design theory’ (ID) misconceives and misapplies the nature of scientific explanation, I shall devote the last entries of this series to discuss […]