Category archives: Philosophy of science

On scientific co-authorship (& 3): Intelectual property rights and the individualization of items of knowledge

On scientific co-authorship (& 3): Intelectual property rights and the individualization of items of knowledge

Philosophy of science

By Jesús Zamora Bonilla

In our previous entries , we asked why it is that collaborating scientists prefer to publish one single paper in which all their contributions are ‘mixed’, instead of one individual paper by each co-author (with quotations to the other collaborator’s paper where necessary). There is a relatively obvious (but, as I shall show, partial) answer […]

On scientific co-authorship (2): An economic diversion, Ronald Coase’s theory of the firm

On scientific co-authorship (2): An economic diversion, Ronald Coase’s theory of the firm

EconomicsPhilosophy of science

By Jesús Zamora Bonilla

Let me leave aside for a moment our talk about scientists and papers, and bring up a topic that, at first sight, might seem totally unconnected: Ronald Coase’s economic theory about the firm and the allocation of property rights. As in the case of the problem we mentioned in our last entry (why scientists share […]

On scientific co-authorship (1): Why do scientists publish together?

On scientific co-authorship (1): Why do scientists publish together?

Philosophy of science

By Jesús Zamora Bonilla

The allocation of merit to individual scientists is one of the crucial aspects of how scientific systems work. Publication of ‘papers’ in important journals, and, still most significantly, citation of those papers in the works of colleagues, is perhaps (with all its shortcomings ) the most determinant mechanism for recognising the value and capacity of […]

What do we think? Scientific knowledge after judgment aggregation

What do we think? Scientific knowledge after judgment aggregation

Philosophy of science

By Jesús Zamora Bonilla

After centuries of debate, there is no agreement about whether ‘knowledge’ must be essentially conceived as a cognitive state of individual minds, or must be attributed to some collective entity, i.e., whether it’s me , or we , who ‘really’ knows. A promising analytical approach to this problem has emerged in recent years, which is […]