Since this will be a series of entries about something as weird as the ‘prehistory’ of philosophy of science, I think readers deserve a little explanation about what I do exactly mean by that. ‘Philosophy of science’, to begin with, is a topic that took its current status as an autonomous academic field (I mean […]
nets One of the most interesting aspects of Joseph Sneed’s structuralist view of science is the one I mentioned in passing in my last entry: the fact that a scientific theory must not be understood as a mere combination or conjunction of different propositions (its “axioms”, plus the indefinite number of assertions they make about […]
Let me make a short interruption in our series about the prehistory of philosophy of science, to discuss a completely different point. I am writing this now, just because in the last days I think I have been able to clearly formulate a specific perplexity that for many years I had felt about what we […]