For the problem of scientific realism, the most consequential implication of the ‘ugly duckling theorem’ we met in our last entry was that judgments of similarity seem to be not reducible to any kind of algorithmic definition that might tell in an objective way how much ‘similar’ is one thing to another, for these judgments […]
As we saw in my last entry, Karl Popper suggested around 1960 a way of formalising the idea that science can proceed towards the (full) truth through a series of theories or hypotheses all of which are literally false. Basically, his proposal was to define the relation of ‘theory A being at least as close […]
Probably, the most common assumption about scientific knowledge amongst the general public, and certainly amongst a substantial percentage of the philosophers of science, is that science attempts to find out the truth about the world (just like many other institutions or professions, like the courts, the police or whoever that needs to look for information […]
Author: Alexander V. Gheorghiu, Research Fellow in Logic or Applied Logic, University College London The rigid structures of language we once clung to with certainty are cracking. Take gender, nationality or religion: these concepts no longer sit comfortably in the stiff linguistic boxes of the last century. Simultaneously, the rise of AI presses upon us […]
The idea of the countless “virtual worlds” that the metaverse will contain is, as we saw in our last entry, an extrapolation of the idea of “video game worlds,” not necessarily regarding their playful nature—since the metaverse is expected to be a place for almost any kind of activity, not just leisure—but in the sense […]
One of the things the media present these days as one of the most important technological advances for the near future is what has come to be called the metaverse . The metaverse could be characterized by two fundamental properties. First, what is now offered to us through more or less large two-dimensional screens (ranging […]
In my past entry I commented on the problems that Angela Potochnik’s Idealization and the Aims of Science contains regarding her analysis of idealization. Now I will look at the question of truth. My main argument is that neither the widespread use of blatant falsities in science, nor the existence of other goals different from […]
Angela Potochnik’s Idealization and the Aims of Science is probably one of the most interesting and ambitious philosophy of science books of the last years. It offers a picture of scientific knowledge and of its production that elaborates on, and wisely amends, some of the best literature in the recent ‘pragmatist’ tradition of philosophy of […]
Modern physics suggests time may be an illusion. Einstein’s theory of relativity, for example, suggests the universe is a static, four-dimensional block that contains all of space and time simultaneously – with no special “now”. What’s the future to one observer, is the past to another. That means time doesn’t flow from past to future […]
I am these days reading the delightful (though at times quite demanding) Reviel Netz’s A New History of Greek Mathematics, and I have not resisted the temptation of sharing with you some of the many pearls it contains. One of the most interesting aspects of the book is that it is not a mere ‘survey’ […]