As we saw in the previous entry of this series, philosophers of mind usually distinguish between what (after David Chalmers) they called the ‘easy’ and the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness. The ‘easy’ problem refers to how to explain the functioning of the brain: how does it manage to do things that seem to require some […]
One of the most strongly debated philosophical problems is that of the nature of consciousness. This is no surprise, since it is probably the most difficult question, at least apparently, for naturalistic or materialistic views of the world. After all, the necessity of having a spiritual cause of the existence and order of the cosmos […]
In my past entry I described the tribe of the ‘Halflings’ as those authors who try to find a middle road between the ‘Platonist’ that identify beauty as one essential goal of scientific research (even conflating it, in the end, with truth itself), and the ‘Sceptics’ that assume that aesthetic criteria are essentially subjective and […]
One traditional question in the philosophy of science, or perhaps it would be better to say in the philosophical views about science, is the role that aesthetic judgments and emotions play in the evaluation of theories, models, hypotheses, or experiments. We can classify the main positions about this question in roughly three groups. In the […]
One last aspect in which Dembski’s use of the ideas of information and probability are confusing is the fact that it seems to ignore what is an inescapable consequence of a theory ( T ) being an explanation of certain phenomena or empirical laws ( E ). Since a necessary requisite for T to explain […]
After having shown the ways in which Richard Dembski’s ‘explanatory filter’ (EF) in support of the ‘intelligent design theory’ (ID) misconceives and misapplies the nature of scientific explanation, I shall devote the last entries of this series to discuss another mistake in Dembski’s work: the way in which he employs the ‘no free lunch’ theorems […]
If in the two previous entries of this series we have seen that (contrarily to what Dembski’s filter suggests and needs) ‘law’ and ‘hazard’ are not different types of explanations, but necessary and complementary elements of basically all explanatory models, I will try to show here that ‘explanation from purpose’ is not as significantly different […]
Besides confusing what a scientific explanation is, as we saw in the previous entry , Dembski’s ‘explanatory filter’ (‘anything must be explained by law, by chance, or by design’) also commits the worst mistake that can be committed while using the logical rule known as ‘disjunctive syllogism’ (“either p or q; not p; ergo q”) […]
Yes, I talk to you, even more if you are one of those scientists working with any living being either unicellular or multicellular with sexual dimorphism seared in their chromosomes. Such a question may seem trivial. However, recent findings suggest that it is not so trifling, and that an affirmative answer could have major implications […]
The most notorious argument presented in favour of the theory that asserts that living beings are necessarily the result of a conscious and deliberate act of intelligent creation, is William Dembski’s ‘explanatory filter’ (EF). According to this argument, when explaining anything, we have three alternatives: first, we shall try to explain it as the result […]